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If the person who had done us some great injury, who
had murdered our father or our brother, for example,
should soon afterwards die of a fever, or even be brought
to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though
it might sooth our hatred, it would not fully gratify our
resentment. Resentment would prompt us to desire, not
only that he should be punished, but that he should be
punished by our means, and upon account of that par-
ticular injury which he had done to us. (Adam Smith1)
1. Introduction
The desire for revenge, to punish those who did wrong upon oneself,
is a strong motivation for humans. From ancient Greek dramas to
modern movies, it is ubiquitous in storylines. It has also been the focus
of extensive research in economics, both in the form of experiments
which find that, indeed, subjects are willing to forgo monetary gains to
exert punishment, and in the form of theoretical models that seek to
explain such behavior. However, both the quote by Adam Smith above
and many prominent fictional works2 feature a very specific form of
punishment: According to Adam Smith, humans not only care about
punishment being inflicted on the perpetrator of a crime against them,
but they also value carrying out that punishment themselves, in person.
It is this, personal, characteristic of punishment that we try to isolate in
the laboratory. Our experiment is designed to exclude other possible
reasons why one would be willing to give up money to punish. In
particular, subjects do not have to spend money to assure punishment
is carried out, they only spend money to assure it is carried out by
them personally.
In our experiment we first establish a situation where punishment
is possible: One group of subjects (type A) take part in a real effort
task to create an endowment, which is then distributed by the non-
working subjects of type B. Subjects B can either leave the complete
1In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, page 113.
2To use two well known movies as examples: In Pulp Fiction, after being rescued
from a rapist by Butch, Marsellus tells Butch, who is about to kill the rapist, to
move aside, so he can shoot the rapist himself. Similarly, in Dogville, Grace, after
ordering her father’s men to torch the village which enslaved her, kills the man who
hurt her most personally, telling her father: “Some things, you have to do yourself”.
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endowment to A, or take away 80% of it. After learning the distribu-
tion chosen by B, subjects A are allowed to punish B by destroying
a part of the money that B allocated to herself.3 We use two sepa-
rate decisions to split the demand for personal punishment from the
demand for punishment in general. In a first question, subjects A get
to decide whether B will be punished. Then, knowing that B will be
punished for sure, we ask subjects A whether they want to be the one
to personally and physically execute the punishment. We do this by
means of a second price auction where we auction off the right to be
the one to execute the punishment. Since the auction has a winner in
any case, punishment is always ensured. The bids in the auction elicit
subject A’s willingness to pay for personal punishment.
More than a third of our subjects bid positive amounts in the per-
sonal punishment auction. Bidding for personal punishment is higher
by subjects who also wanted any, potentially non-personal, punishment
in the first question. We interpret bidding in the auction as a desire,
among our subjects, to actively punish, as opposed to having the per-
petrators payout reduced by a third party.
This is in line with models which include actions, along with payoffs,
in the utility function, as in Andreoni (1990). He examines the private
provision of a public good and models the utility of individuals as a
function not only of the amount of the public good but also of the
own gift to the public good. This individual donation produces what
Andreoni calls a “warm glow”, utility derived from the act of giving.
In a fMRI experiment Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart (2007) identifiy
this joy of giving within the brain.
In the same vein as joy of giving, there is also a joy of punishing: Di-
rect neuroeconomic evidence that subjects “like” to punish was found
by de Quervain, Fischbacher, Treyer, Schellhammer, Schnyder, Buck,
and Fehr (2004), who use PET recordings of brain activation to inves-
tigate the mechanisms in the brain involved in punishment. Subjects
played a trust game where cooperating players could punish defecting
partners. In the punishment condition activation of the dorsal striatum
was found, which is well known for its reward processing properties.
This could either be due to the fact that the defecting partner lost
money or it could be pleasure derived from the act of punishing. This
3For ease of exposition, let A be male and B be female.
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real effort punishment auction for auction for participants
opportunity personal punishment dummy envelope
1A yes yes yes no 76
2A yes yes yes yes 40
NC no no no yes 33
Table 1. Experimental designs
is what we disentangle in our experiment as the decision to punish is
separated from the decision to punish personally.
Further evidence comes from a measurement of affective happiness,
which we conduct before and after the experiment: Subjects who win
the personal punishment auction and thus have to pay the second high-
est bid, but get to be the ones to execute the punishment, become
happier.
In the next section, we introduce the design of the experiment and
discuss related literature. Section 3 presents our hypotheses and section
4 the results. Finally, in section 5, we conclude.
2. Experiment
2.1. Designs. To test the demand for personal punishment, we use
three related experimental designs, 1A (one auction), 2A (two auctions)
and NC (no context).4 We start by describing 1A.
Design 1A. Subjects were matched in groups of four; each group con-
sists of three subjects A and one subject B. The experiment was anony-
mous, so subjects never learned about the identity of the other subjects
they were matched with. Instructions for the experiment, which fully
described the experiment for both type A and type B, were handed
to subjects at the start of the experiment. After reading the instruc-
tions, subjects had to answer a series of detailed questions in order to
make sure that they understood the experimental instructions. Only
when all subjects had correctly answered these test questions, did the
experiment proceed.5
4See the online-appendix for translations of all instruction material:
http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/md/awi/professuren/with2/pdjm-pp-appendix.zip
5Subjects who were not able to answer the test questions correctly were replaced
by extra participants (who were otherwise dismissed with a flat payment after
reading the instructions).
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Instructions Test
Questions
Q 1 Stage 1 - 4 Destroy Q 2 Payment
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Division
by B
Decision
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Auction
Figure 1. Timing
In the first stage,6 all subjects A participated in a real effort task
where they could earn EUR 10. They were asked to fill a sheet of
graph paper (A5, 148× 210 mm, about 1260 squares) with alternating
o and + signs. The allocated time frame was 25 minutes. Subjects
who did not finish the task in time dropped out of the experiment and
received no money apart from the show up fee. We chose this particular
task for two reasons: First, it is simple and does not require any special
abilities, so all subjects should be equally fit for the task. Second, as we
found out in previous tests, the task is considerably more exhausting
than it appears. We wanted to induce a feeling of ownership towards
the money in those subjects who completed the task. On the other
hand, it was to look easy to the non-participating subjects B. During
the task, all subjects B were sitting in the same room as the subjects
A, but without any assignment.
After the task, the experimenters collected the sheets and informed
each subject B how many subjects A in her group had succeeded. Upon
learning that information, in stage two, subject B had to decide on an
allocation of the money earned by the subjects A in the previous stage.
The only two allocations available were (2,8): 2 for A, 8 for B, or
(10,0): 10 for A, 0 for B.7 Subject B could only implement the same
6The instructions use a different numbering, since we subdivided some stages for
clarity. We also handed to all subjects a flow chart as an overview what happens
in each stage. The flow charts are included in the Online-Appendix.
7The distributional choice of subjects B is similar to the one in a dictator
game (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)) or ultimatum game (Gu¨th, Schmit-
tberger, and Schwarze (1982).) with a restricted choice domain. Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher (2003) use similar distributional choices in a series of restricted ulti-
matum games.
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allocation for all three subjects A she was matched with, not different
allocations for different subjects A. So in the case of three successful
subjects A subject B had to decide between 24 for herself and 2 for
each A or 0 for herself and 10 for each A.
Before stage three, the experimenters informed all subjects A about
the decision of their matched B. The money that subject B allocated
to A was handed to subject A. The money that subject B allocated to
herself was also handed to subject A, however it was put in an envelope.
Then all subjects A had to decide whether they wanted to reduce sub-
ject B’s payoff by destroying one of the three envelopes designated for
B. If all A’s decided not to reduce, the envelopes were collected by the
experimenters, handed to subject B and stage four did not take place.
If at least one subject A decided to reduce, the entire group entered
stage four.8 Here, all subjects A of the group took part in a sealed bid
second price auction. The highest bidder won the right to destroy the
envelope lying in front of him. Only the envelope of the winner was
destroyed.9 Note that subjects B’s payoff depends entirely on stages 1
to 3. The auction only selected the subject A who would destroy the
envelope, it did not affect subject B’s payoff. The auction provides a
non-arbitrary way to separate the decision to punish from the decision
to punish personally. Since, in a second price auction, no participant
has a reason to misrepresent his preferences, subjects are incentivized
to truthfully state the value they attach to personal punishment.
The auction winner was informed that he won the auction and about
the second highest bid he had to pay. He could then proceed to destroy
the envelope of subject B. The instructions did not specify any mode
of destruction; however a small metal bin was present on the tables of
8Subjects where informed that stage four had been reached, but not informed
about the number of subjects A who had decided to reduce.
9The minimum feasible bid was zero, the maximum feasible bid 10 and subjects
could bid in increments of 0.01 (one cent). If there was a tie, the experimenters
randomly chose a winner. This also applies to the special case of all three subjects
A choosing a bid of zero. The upper limit of 10 for the bids ensured that losses
were not possible. At this stage of the experiment, subjects of type A had received
the show-up fee of 8, in the division stage the matched subject B could give to A
either 2 or 10, so when the auction happens all type A subject will have at least
10.
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each subject A.10 The envelopes in front of the non-winning subjects
A were collected by the experimenters and delivered to the respective
subject B.
Between the test questions and the real effort task we asked some
demographics from our subjects and two questions about their happi-
ness (“how happy are you in general”/“how happy are you right now”).
After stage four and before paying, we presented subjects with a sec-
ond questionnaire asking their happiness again (only “how happy are
you right now”), their perception of subject B’s behavior and several
attitude questions11. All subjects received a EUR 8 “show up fee” for
answering the questionnaires. If a subject A had won the auction and
had to pay more money than he earned in the experiment, he had to
use a part of those EUR 8 to pay for his bid.
Design 2A. The 2A design is similar to design 1A, with the difference
that it uses two auctions instead of one. Stages one to three are iden-
tical to 1A. However, in the auction stage, subjects had to make two
bids. Bid one was for the auction as described above. For the second
auction, the experimenters placed a second envelope in front of the each
subject A. The instructions stated that this envelope would be, unless
destroyed, collected again by the experimenters and would never have
any influence on the payoff of subjects A or subjects B. That is, the
second envelope is a dummy, intended to test whether subjects would
be willing to pay for destruction of any envelope. After bids were made,
the experimenters threw a coin in public to determine whether auction
one or auction two would be enacted. Only the bids from the chosen
auction did count, and only the envelope from the auction chosen was
destroyed by the winning subject A. If auction one was chosen, the
winner destroyed his envelope from auction one, the other envelopes
where handed to subject B, and all three envelopes from auction two
were collected by experimenters. If auction two was chosen, the win-
ner destroyed his envelope from auction two, the other envelopes from
auction two where collected by the experimenters. In this case, the ex-
perimenters also randomly retained one of the envelopes from auction
10The subjects chose different methods to “destroy”: Most ripped the envelope
apart – some ripped just once, some ripped until only small pieces of paper were
left – and deposited the pieces inside the metal bin. Some just folded the envelope.
11See Online-Appendix.
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one, such that subject B received the same amount of envelopes, no
matter whether auction one or auction two was chosen by the coin-flip.
Design NC. Finally, we used the NC condition to separate the auc-
tion stage from the rest of our experiment. To insure that condi-
tions remained comparable, we conducted the control subsequent to
another, unrelated and about 1 hour long, experiment, where the sub-
jects earned on average EUR 10.60.12 This money was used to pay for
bids in the control auction. After the end of the other experiment,
we distributed the instructions for NC. Instructions and test questions
were as close as possible to those in the main experiment, but only
included the auction stage.13
Subjects were placed in groups of three (corresponding to our group
size of three subjects A, who did participate in the auction). The
highest bidder won the right to destroy an envelope lying in front of
him (the envelope was not payoff relevant, as in auction two of 2A).
The winner of the auction could destroy the envelope, all others were
collected by the experimenters. Auction winners were paid what they
earned in the prior experiment minus the second highest bid in their
group.
2.2. Related literature. In the last 20 years, the topic of punishment
occurring in situations where no direct monetary incentive to punish
exists has been studied extensively in the economic literature. Some
recent surveys can be found in the papers by Balliet, Mulder, and Van
Lange (2011), Chaudhuri (2011), and Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2009).
In all previous experimental designs that we known of, achieving
punishment (leading to a reduced payoff for the punished person) and
punishing personally are not separated. We introduce a separate de-
cision for personal punishment, after the decision whether to reduce
the payoff is already taken. Carpenter (2007) and Anderson and Put-
terman (2006) find that the demand for punishment is decreasing in
the price of punishment. Separating a demand for personal punish-
ment from the overall demand for punishment is only feasible if some
12This is close to the average earnings of EUR 10.81 that subjects of type A had
accumulated in the other conditions (2A and 1A) before the auction was conducted.
13We used both envelopes filled with paper money and empty envelopes (the
unrelated prior experiment did not use paper money), but did not find any difference
and pooled the data.
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demand for punishment in general exists. Therefore, in the first pun-
ishment decision, we set the price for reducing the perpetrators payoff
equal to the lowest possible value of zero. That is, a payoff reduction
can be achieved without any cost. Only the second decision, to punish
personally, is costly.
In a series of papers (Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher, 2003, 2005, 2008),
Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher investigate the connection between differ-
ent fairness norms and sanctioning behavior. In the 2003 paper, they
use a mini-ultimatum game, which features payoff distributions similar
to those that our subjects B can implement in stage 2. Different to the
mini-ultimatum game, our subjects A do not get an option to “reject”.
Instead, they can, without cost, reduce the payoff of B, however not to
the point that B’s payoff is reduced to zero. As their main result, the
authors find that in terms of sanctioning, both payoff differences to the
person being sanctioned and intentions of that person matter. This is
a sign that theories of reciprocity based exclusively on payoffs do not
fully capture sanctioning. In our research we also look for evidence
that preferences of punishers go beyond payoffs, but we proceed in a
different direction. It is not the intentions of the punished person we
are interested in, but the evaluation of the action of punishment by the
punisher. A positive demand for personal punishment can be seen as
evidence for an action-based utility function.
The papers most closely related to our design are Casari and Luini
(2009, 2012). They test whether punishment is treated as a second-
order public good. After a public goods game, participants have the
opportunity to assign punishment points to each other. In one treat-
ment, punishment is sequential: Later punishers assign their punish-
ment points knowing the previously assigned punishment points. As it
turns out, subjects mostly ignore the second-order public goods aspect
of punishment and assign points irrespective of being first or second
punisher, again in line with an utility function based on the action of
punishment. Different to our design, Casari and Luini do not separate
the decision to personally punish from the decision to reduce the offend-
ers payoff. Both movers can asure personal punishment by assigning
punishment points, but that implies, at the same time, a reduction
in payoff. In a recent working paper, Ouss and Peysakhovich (2013)
have a treatment similar to Casari and Luini, with equivalent results.
Both pairs of authors extend the model of Andreoni (1990) into the
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negative domain (positive utility derived from punishment instead of
giving) and argue in favor of action-based utility.
Naturally, punishment is also a research topic in psychology, where
the focus was mostly on the person being punished, but more recently
psychologists also try to understand the motives of the person who pun-
ishes. Looking for subjective punishment goals of victims, Orth (2003)
found five punishment goals: retaliation, recognition of victim status,
confirmation of societal values, victim security, and societal security.
These goals fall into the two broad classical justifications for punish-
ment: retribution and utilitarian motives. The retribution perspective
is sometimes also referred to as “just deserts”, and it summarizes the
idea that a offender shall be punished to suffer in proportion to his
malefaction. Here punishment is justiciable in itself, the utilitarian
perspective focuses on its possible positive future consequences, like
deterrence and incapacitation. Studies using hypothetical cases and
questionnaires have found that people answer that they have both kind
of motivations, retribution and utilitarian motives, for punishment. By
examining what kind of information people use when deciding on pun-
ishment recent studies found evidence that people punish primarily on
the basis of retribution (e.g. Darley, Carlsmith, and Robinson (2000);
Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson (2002); Carlsmith (2006)). As utili-
tarian motives can also be fulfilled if someone else punishes an offender,
only a motivation of retribution could explain a demand for personal
punishment.
2.3. Procedures. The experiment was conducted the laboratory of
the Sonderforschungsbereich 504 in Mannheim and in the laboratory
of the economics department at the University of Heidelberg. In total,
149 subjects participated in the experiment (40% male, 60% female).
Subjects were students of various fields at the University of Heidelberg
and the University of Mannheim. The experiment consisted of eight
sessions; no subject participated twice. The 2A treatment was con-
ducted in Heidelberg, the 1A and the NC treatments in Mannheim.14
All recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
In both laboratories seats are separated by dividers. In Heidelberg
subjects are seated in two long rows facing the walls, in Mannheim there
14In 1A and 2A there were usually 20 subjects in a session, in one session in 1A
only 16 subjects participated. In the two NC-sessions we had 24 and 9 participants.
10 TAKING PUNISHMENT INTO YOUR OWN HANDS: AN EXPERIMENT
are a several rows, each providing four seats. Subjects could not see
each other unless they deliberately leaned away from their workspace.
In interaction with the subjects, e.g. when announcing auction winners,
the experimenters approached every seat, regardless of that subject
being a winner or not, to avoid giving away additional information.
In total, the experiment lasted slightly less than 2 hours, for which
we paid an average of EUR 13.79 (only averaging over subjects in 1A
and 2A.) The full experiment was conducted via pen and paper. During
the experiment, we used an experimental currency unit called “Thaler”.
Thaler were a printed play money handed to subjects during the ex-
periment. At the end of the experiment, we exchanged all Thaler into
Euro at a rate of 1:1.15 All subjects were paid in cash and private.
3. Hypotheses
If we assume a purely money-maximising selfish individual, such an
individual could choose punishment in our experiment (as it is free of
cost), but should not care about the way in which subject B’s payoff
is reduced, i.e. personal punishment cannot be explained.
Spurred on by the experimental observation that people do not al-
ways act purely selfish, theories of other-regarding preferences have
been put forward. Inequity aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) add to the utility derived from own in-
come a term that represents concern about the payoff distribution.
These kind of models can explain why people punish as this usually
reduces inequality in the payoffs, but can not explain a demand for
personal punishment.16
Other theories (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004;
Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) develop techniques to embed concerns for
reciprocity and capture intentions. Using these models, one can again
explain punishment: an unkind action of typeB (choosing (2, 8) instead
of (10, 0)) is reciprocated by an unkind action of type A (punishment
reduces the payoff of subject B), but not personal punishment.
15The main reason for using play money was that we did not want subjects to
worry about destroying legal tender.
16Inequity is reduced by punishment in our design (the higher payoff of B is re-
duced at no cost to A), but inequality is increased by personal punishment (bidding
does not further decrease B’s payoff, but reduces the payoff of the winning A).
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We are not primarily interested in the fact that the payoff of an of-
fender is reduced, but especially in who will derive satisfaction from
punishing. Only the person who conducted the punishment? Or ev-
eryone who saw the offender being punished, even if the punishment
was not conducted “personally”?
Perhaps the theory closest to our design is the warm glow theory by
Andreoni (1990) (see sections 1 & 2.2). If one assumes, in a similar
manner to utility being derived from the act of giving, that the act of
punishing enters the utility function positively, one would arrive at a
theory that could account for a demand to punish personally.
Following Andreoni and the reasoning of Adam Smith, we believe
that our subjects want to take punishment into their own hands. This
is also connected to the idea of self-efficacy which is defined as the
belief of having the capability to reach desired effects with one’s own
actions and to reach goals (Bandura, 1977). If subjects desire a higher
self-efficacy, they should bid in the personal punishment auction.
These considerations lead to our main hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Personal punishment: Subjects A bid more in the per-
sonal punishment auction than in the dummy auction.
Connected to hypothesis 1 we would also expect those subjects who
punish personally to have some emotional payoff from doing so that
makes their monetary loss worthwhile.
To measure this, we asked the subjects about their happiness. We
used two different questions ”How happy are you in general?” and ”How
happy are you at the moment?” (see section 2.1).
Research on happiness uses the term subjective well-being. This term
refers to people’s evaluations of their life. Often it is separated into
evaluative happiness and affective happiness, where the former refers to
the assessment of the life as a whole and the latter to the daily feelings
or moods (Diener, 2000). As an event of little account, i.e. punishment
in the experiment, should not influence someone’s life satisfaction, we
asked out subjects about their happiness at the moment to assess their
affective happiness. There exist various measures of subjective-well
being, but for simplicity we use a single question about happiness.
Such a single question self-report measurement is used, for example, in
the United Kingdom Office for National Statistics (ONS) survey.
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treatment groups punishment bid observations17
(choice by B) yes no punishment auction dummy auction
1A (10,0) 3 2 7 9 -
(2,8) 16 28 20 45 -
2A (10,0) 0 0 0 0 0
(2,8) 10 18 12 30 30
NC 11 - - - 33
total 29 48 39 84 63
Column 2: Each group includes 1 subject B and 3 matched subjects
A. Column 3&4: decisions by subjects A. Column 5&6: number of bid
observations from subjects’ A resulting from groups where the auction
was happening.
Table 2. Overview punishment and auction stage
How should personal punishment influence someone’s mood? Self-
efficacy plays a role in happiness, as stated by Maddox (2002): ”Most
philosophers and psychological theorists agree that a sense of control
over our behavior, our environment, and our own thoughts and feelings
is essential for happiness and a sense of well-being.” This leads to the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Happiness: Subjects A who punish personally are hap-
pier than those who do not.
4. Results
Stages one and two of our treatments 1A and 2A were constructed
to produce a large number of observations where punishment could
possibly occur. A first look at the data confirms that this goal is
achieved. All 87 subjects A in 1A and 2A did complete the real effort
task, therefore all 29 subjects B had to make their decision for three
matched successful subjects A. Out of the 29 subjects B, all but three
implemented the allocation (2, 8), which was worse for subjects A. All
three subjects B implementing (10, 0) played in design 1A.
Trying to find personal punishment is only viable if there is some
punishment in the first place. Given the allocation of their matched
subject B, all subjects A could chose to have the auction in stage four
implemented. Demanding the auction is equivalent to subject B being
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punished, since this ensures that subject B’s payoff will be reduced by
8.
Subjects A who faced the “bad” (2,8) split demand the auction sig-
nificantly more often than those who got the “nice” (10, 0) allocation
(p = 0.040, 87 obs., one-sided Fisher-exact test). See table 2 for an
overview of which groups voted for punishment. In total, 55% of sub-
jects A demanded the auction to happen in stage 3. However, since
the auction is implemented if at least one subject A demands it, the
auction takes place in almost all of our groups.17
Table 3 shows the percentage of subjectsA who bid a positive amount
in the auctions. Recall that bids in the auction are not payoff relevant
for subject B, only whether the auction happens or not influences the
payoff of subject B. Subjects A who are either strict money maximizers
or only interested in the monetary consequences of punishment for
the matched subject B have no incentive to bid larger than zero. In
contrast to that, we find that, in total, 36% of our subjects bid positive
amounts of money in the punishment auction (line 1). So a substantial
minority of subjects is interested enough in punishing personally to be
willing to sacrifice some of their own money to achieve this.
We also find some positive bids of subjects who did not want the
auction to happen in the previous stage (lines 3), but the average
bid by subjects who wanted the auction (line 2) is significantly higher
(p = 0.043, 84 obs., two-sided MWU test). One possible explanation
for bids from subjects A who did not previously demand punishment
is counter-punishment: By bidding the second highest amount in the
auction, subjects A can (counter-)punish the auction winner for pun-
ishing B. If the possibility of counter-punishment leads to an overall
reduction of bids, then the counter-punishment effect runs opposite to
the personal punishment effect and should bias our estimates for per-
sonal punishment towards zero, making our estimates conservative.18
17Whether the auction happens depends on the random matching of subjects A
into groups of 3. The auction did not happen in one group in 1A, which had seen
the distribution (2, 8). In 2 additional groups (one which saw (2, 8) and one which
saw (10, 0)), all subjects did not want the auction to happen, but none-the-less,
due to a procedural error, subjects entered bids (assuming an auction would take
place). These groups are included in the bids data, even though no auction took
place.
18We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the possibility of counter-
punishment.
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bids by subjects A treat. obs. avg.(SD) max bid>0 bid=0
punishment auction 1A,2A 84 0.43 (1.11) 5.50 36% 64%
wanted auction: yes 1A,2A 48 0.51 (1.24) 5.50 46% 54%
wanted auction: no 1A,2A 36 0.32 (0.93) 4.00 22% 78%
saw (2, 8) 1A,2A 75 0.48 (1.17) 5.50 39% 61%
saw (10, 0) 1A,2A 9 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 11% 89%
dummy auction present 2A 30 0.34 (0.98) 4.00 37% 63%
DA not present 1A 54 0.48 (1.18) 5.50 35% 65%
dummy auction 2A, NC 63 0.36 (1.32) 6.50 35% 65%
context 2A 30 0.03 (0.10) 0.50 17% 83%
no context NC 33 0.67 (1.78) 6.50 52% 48%
Table 3. Bids
In contrast to subjects who could feel “wronged” by the distribution
(2, 8), subjects who got the benefitial distribution (10, 0) almost never
bid (lines 4-5).19 Finally, bids are similar (p = 0.913, 84 obs., two-sided
MWU test) in the punishment auctions of treatments 1A and 2A (lines
6-7), but very different (p = 0.007, 63 obs., two-sided MWU test) in the
dummy auctions of treatments 2A, where another auction with context
is present, and NC, where no context is given at all (lines 9-10).
The positive bids in the punishment auctions indicate that our sub-
jects want personal punishment, but a more direct test for the exis-
tence of personal punishment is the comparison of the results for the
two auctions in design 2A (lines 6 and 9). Here, within subject, are
two identical auctions, leading to a similar result (an envelope gets de-
stroyed and subject B loses a payoff of 8), the only difference is whether
subjects get to destroy an unrelated envelope or the envelope belonging
to subject B. Table 3 reveals a large difference in average bids, and
19The difference is almost significant (p = 0.076, 84 obs., two-sided MWU test).
However, we have only few observations where groups saw (10, 0).
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frequency of positive bids.20 A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test shows that
this difference is significant (p = 0.015, 30 obs.).21
Result 1. a) In the context of an experienced unfair split of earnings,
more than one third of subjects bid in an auction for personal punish-
ment.
b) Bids for personal punishment are higher by subjects who wanted pun-
ishment than by those who did not.
c) Bids for personal punishment are higher than bids in a simultane-
ous dummy auction, but not higher than in a dummy auction without
earnings context.
The second part of result 1c was surprising to us. The bids for the
dummy auction are very different in 2A and NC. This points out the
importance of giving subjects a context in which to evaluate an auction.
Without the preceding stages, the auction must have made little sense
to subjects in NC.22 This could very well be an experimenter demand
effect (Zizzo, 2010). Interestingly, this effect is reduced when subjects
have to simultaneously participate in two auctions: Even though the
price (destroy an unrelated envelope) in the dummy auction in 2A is
identical to the price in the single auction in NC, the bids are much
lower in 2A. It seems as if subjects only feel compelled to bid – to
possibly please the experimenter – if the bidding is the only action
in the experiment and if there is no morale for or against bidding
possible. In 2A, when making multiple decisions, not bidding becomes
acceptable.
Finally, we look at the result of the physical destruction carried out
by the winners of the auction. Do they enjoy the act of destroying
20While very infrequent, there is some bidding in the dummy auction in 2A. The
answers from the subject with the highest bid in the dummy auction to an open
ended question about motivation for bidding are perhaps revealing:
(personal punishment auction): “Even though subject B is in no way affected (since
he always gets 2 envelopes), it feels good to release some pressure this way”
(dummy auction): “To erase the feeling of anger, that, even though I did the whole
work, candidate B will earn 3x as much”
21A sign test leads to a similar result (p = 0.016, 30 obs., one-sided sign test).
22In all designs, subjects had to correctly answer a set of test questions before the
experiment proceeded. However, the test questions only related to the mechanism
of the auction (and the previous stages for 1A and 2A), not any possible rationale
behind holding it.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
auction winner 0.692∗∗ 0.692∗∗ 0.706∗∗ 0.659∗∗
(0.262) (0.263) (0.293) (0.281)
wanted auction −0.171 −0.169 −0.108
(0.255) (0.257) (0.256)
bid −0.013 0.048
(0.121) (0.120)
(10, 0)-distribution 1.150∗∗
(0.479)
age −0.006
(0.044)
female −0.301
(0.270)
constant −0.269 −0.164 −0.163 0.020
(0.151) (0.218) (0.220) (1.039)
N 78 78 78 78
R2 0.084 0.089 0.090 0.195
adj. R2 0.072 0.065 0.053 0.127
Notes: dependent variable: happiness difference; ** denotes signifi-
cance at 5%-level; standard errors in parentheses; bid : the bids from
the punishment auction (1A and 2A)[in both sessions of 2A, the coin
flip chose the punishment auction, therefore the punishment auction
was resolved and the data is used in the regressions]
Table 4. Regression on happiness difference for the
punishment auctions 1A, 2A
subject B’s money? We asked all participants to report their subjec-
tive affective happiness on a seven point scale at the start and at the
end of the experiment.23 While the absolute level might depend on
a number of causes we can not control, we can use the difference in
affective happiness between the start and end of the experiment. Let
the happiness difference be the amount of affective happiness reported
at the end of our experiment minus the amount reported at the start.
So subjects with a positive happiness difference felt better after our
experiment than before.
23See Online-Appendix for the translated questionnaires.
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Subjects who actually punished subject B were happier than those
who did not (p = 0.02, 78 obs., two-sided MWU test).24
Table 4 reports regressions on happiness difference for the punish-
ment auctions in treatments 1A and 2A. The regression shows that
subjects A who went on to win the auction are happier than those who
did not win. So despite being paid less money in the end, subjects who
personally destroyed subject B’s money leave the experiment happier
that those who do not, in line with hypothesis 2. The other significant
predictor is the (10, 0)-distribution. Not surprisingly, subjects A who
encountered the allocation (10,0) felt happier compared to those who
received only EUR 2 from allocation (2,8).
Result 2. Subjects who won the auction for personal punishment are
happier than those who did not.
While in treatments 1A and 2A winning the auction is equivalent
to actually punishing subject B, this is not the case in treatment NC,
where winning the action has no such meaning. In treatment NC there
is no significant difference in happiness between those subjects who
won the auction and those who did not (p = 0.26, 33 obs., two-sided
MWU test).
Table 5 reports a regression analysis of happiness difference for sub-
jects25 in treatment NC (following a similar approach as for the 1A and
2A treatments, compare table 4). In the regression analysis auction
winner only has a weakly significant effect in the full model (column
3), where it is significant at the 10%-level.
5. Conclusion
In an experiment designed to separate the decision to punish per-
sonally from the more general decision to punish, we find that many
subjects bid positive amounts in a second price auction that auctions off
24Observations for all groups where the punishment auction took place. In all
sessions of treatment 2A, the coin flip to determine which auction would take place
selected the punishment auction and not the dummy auction. Therefore we have
auction winner data for the punishment auctions in 1A and 2A and auction winner
data for the dummy auction in NC. See footnote 17.
25Obviously, subjects in NC did not see allocations and did not decide on con-
ducting the auction.
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(1) (2) (3)
auction winner 0.364 0.538 0.755∗
(0.344) (0.396) (0.432)
wanted auction
bid −0.96 −0.162
(0.106) 0.136
(10, 0)-distribution
age −0.003
(0.036)
female 0.494
(0.385)
constant 0.273 0.278 0.086
(0.199) (0.199) (1.024)
N 33 33 33
R2 0.035 0.060 0.119
adj. R2 0.004 −0.002 −0.007
Notes: dependent variable: happiness difference; *
denotes significance at 10%-level; standard errors in
parentheses; bid : the bids from the dummy auction
(NC).
Table 5. Regression on happiness difference for the
dummy auction without context
the right to punish personally. Some of these subjects bid substantial
amounts.
The experimental designs are constructed to eliminate a range of
other effects, which might have an influence on subjects decisions in
more general settings. Due to the one-shot nature of the experiment,
it is not possible to use bids as a signaling device for future play. Fur-
thermore, seats in the experiment were separated by blinds, so the
act of punishing was hard to use to express disapproval as in Masclet,
Noussair, Tucker, and Villeval (2003). Since punishment is the physi-
cal act of destroying (paper) money, it might be a worry that subjects
like to destroy money. However, the results of our questionnaire sug-
gest otherwise.26 The act of destroying the envelope is a punishment
26The final questionnaire included the question “Do you like destroying money?”.
Not one of the subjects answered with yes. Additionally, subjects were given the
TAKING PUNISHMENT INTO YOUR OWN HANDS: AN EXPERIMENT 19
of subject B, not money burning as in Zizzo (2003), where no strategic
component was involved. Most importantly, the bids in the auction,
and thus the willingness to pay for personal punishment, have no in-
fluence on the payoff of the offending subject B. Subject B’s payoff
is completely determined in stages 1 to 3. One of the mandatory test
questions covered this point to make it clear to every subject. Our de-
cision to use a second price sealed bid auction stems from the previous
considerations. It is a fast and incentive compatible method that lets
us elicit a very fine grained willingness to pay for personal punishment.
Since the auction always has a winner, it emphasizes the point that
punishment will always occur, regardless of the bids of subjects A.
The personal punishment we address in this paper differs from anti-
social punishment as in Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter (2008), which
is punishing people that behaved pro-socially. In our case, when sub-
jects B decided on the distribution, they (mostly) chose the unfair
(2, 8)-split; they therefore do not behave pro-social. When we look for
antisocial punishment in our data, we find that only 2 out of 9 subjects
(22.2%), who were confronted with the fair or pro-social (10, 0)-split,
voted for punishment.
We further find that winning the auction has a positive effect on
affective happiness. While we can not exclude the possibility that
subjects happiness is only due to winning the auction, the result is
also consistent with subjects enjoying the personal punishment they
achieved.
Using an auction might introduce a motivation to bid due to a “desire
to win”. Van den Bos, Li, Lau, Maskin, Cohen, Montague, and Mc-
Clure (2008) find evidence for this in a sealed bid first price auction.
In one of their treatments, the opponents are other human subjects
(similar to our NC design), while in two other treatments, subjects
bid against computerized agents. Furthermore, all subjects are taught
to calculate the (risk-neutral) Nash-equilibrium strategy, to rule out a
winner’s curse effect stemming from limited cognitive ability. They find
that subjects playing against humans overbid significantly more often
than those playing against computers. There is also evidence from a
fMRI experiment by Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, and Phelps (2008) who
compare subjects’ reactions to losing a lottery versus losing an auction
opportunity to destroy some of their own remaining money during the final ques-
tionnaire. Again, none took this opportunity.
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to conclude that “The fear of losing the social competition inherent in
an auction may lead people to pay too high a price for the good for
sale”. It is possible that, in a similar vein, our subjects did not want
to “lose” the auction and therefore bid positive amounts. Our results
in NC can be seen as further evidence for such an effect. However, in
2A, we directly compare the results of two auctions. If a desire to win
exists, it should influence both auctions in a similar way, yet we find a
significant difference between the two.
Overall, the effects we observe are significant, but not huge. This
is not surprising, since we exclude many other effects which would
otherwise work in a similar direction. In many real life examples, the
demand for punishment and the demand for personal punishment will
be measured simultaneously. Additionally, the personal punishment, as
Adam Smith describes it, is punishment for a grave offense. For obvious
reasons, laboratory experiments can only implement minor offenses.
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